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We consider randomized mechanisms with optional participation. Prefer-
ences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility
functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation
and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. Two important
corollaries of our results are characterizations of an attractive randomized vot-
ing rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and entices participation. This
stands in contrast to a well-known result by Moulin (1988), who proves that no
deterministic voting rule can satisfy both properties simultaneously.
1 Introduction
Let N = {1, 2, . . . } be a countable set of agents and F(N) the set of all finite and non-empty
subsets of N. Moreover, A is a finite set of alternatives and ∆(A) the set of all lotteries
(or probability distributions) over A. A lottery is degenerate if it puts all probability on a
single alternative. We assume that preferences over lotteries are given by skew-symmetric
bilinear (SSB) utility functions as introduced by Fishburn (1982). An SSB function φ is a
function from ∆(A)×∆(A)→ R that is skew-symmetric and bilinear, i.e.,
φ(p, q) = −φ(q, p),
φ(λp+ (1− λ)q, r) = λφ(p, r) + (1− λ)φ(q, r).
for all p, q ∈ ∆(A) and λ ∈ R. Note that, by skew-symmetry, linearity in the first argu-
ment implies linearity in the second argument and that, due to bilinearity, φ is completely
determined by its function values for degenerate lotteries. SSB utility theory is more gen-
eral than the linear expected utility theory due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947),
henceforth vNM, as it does not require independence and transitivity (see, e.g., Fishburn,
1988, 1984b,c, 1982). Hence, every vNM function u is equivalent to an SSB function φu,
where φu(p, q) = u(p)− u(q), in the sense that both functions induce the same preferences
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over lotteries. In general, let Φ ⊆ RA×A be a set of possible utility functions called the
domain.
For every N ∈ F(N), let φN = (φi)i∈N ∈ Φ
N be a vector of SSB functions. If N = {i},
we write φi with abuse of notation. A lottery p is welfare-maximizing for φN if∑
i∈N
φi(p, q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(A). (welfare maximization)
If agents are endowed with vNM functions, welfare maximization is equivalent to maxi-
mizing the sum of expected utilities. In this case, there always exists a degenerate welfare-
maximizing lottery. When moving to general SSB functions, this does not hold anymore,
but the existence of a (not necessarily degenerate) welfare-maximizing lottery is guaranteed
by the minimax theorem (Fishburn, 1984a).
Our central objects of study are mechanisms that map a vector of SSB functions to
a lottery. A mechanism is welfare-maximizing if it always returns welfare-maximizing
lotteries for vectors of SSB functions from Φ, i.e., for all N ∈ F(N) and φN ∈ Φ
N , f(φN )
is welfare-maximizing.
We will relate welfare maximization to participation. A mechanism satisfies participation
if participating in the mechanism never decreases the welfare of the participating group of
agents. Formally, for every N ∈ F(N), S ( N , and φN ∈ Φ
N ,
∑
i∈S
φi(f(φN ), f(φN\S)) ≥ 0. (participation)
As we will see in Section 3, this strong notion of participation has important consequences
even in settings in which the interpersonal comparison of utility is problematic (such as in
voting).
2 Welfare Maximization and Participation
We are now ready to prove three theorems that highlight the relationship between welfare
maximization and participation. The first result shows that welfare maximization implies
participation. While this is straightforward for vNM utility functions, the generalization
to SSB functions will be vital for the results in Section 3.
Theorem 1. Every welfare-maximizing mechanism satisfies participation.
Proof. Let N ∈ F(N), S ( N , φN ∈ Φ
N , and f a welfare-maximizing mechanism. Further-
more, let
φN =
∑
i∈N
φi and φ
S =
∑
i∈S
φi and φ
N\S =
∑
i∈N\S
φi.
For p = f(φN ) and p
′ = f(φN\S), we then have that
φN (p, q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(A), and
φN\S(p′, q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ ∆(A),
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since, by assumption, f is welfare-maximizing for φN and φN\S . Thus, it follows that
φS(p, p′) = φN (p, p′)− φN\S(p, p′) = φN (p, p′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+φN\S(p′, p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0.
The second equality follows from skew-symmetry of φN\S . The inequality follows from the
fact that f is welfare-maximizing for φN and φN\S . Hence, f satisfies participation.
Clearly, Theorem 1 also holds for Cartesian domains that are not symmetric among
agents. The converse of Theorem 1 does not hold in full generality as every constant
function satisfies participation but fails to be welfare-maximizing. However, for sufficiently
rich domains, the converse holds for mechanisms that satisfy additional properties.
We first define homogeneity and weak welfare maximization. For all N ∈ F(N) and
k ∈ N, let kN = {i+ lmax(N) : i ∈ N and l ∈ [k]} and φi = φj if i ≡ j mod max(N). A
mechanism f is homogeneous if replicating the set of agents does not affect the outcome, i.e.,
f(φN ) = f(φkN) for all k ∈ N and φN ∈ Φ
N . A mechanism f is weakly welfare-maximizing
if f(φN ) = p whenever p is degenerate and the unique welfare-maximizing lottery for φN .
The following lemma shows that a degenerate lottery is the unique welfare-maximizing
lottery if and only if it is strictly preferred to every other degenerate lottery.
Lemma 1. Let φ ∈ Φ and x ∈ A. x is the unique welfare-maximizing lottery for φ iff
φ(x, y) > 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}.
Proof. For the direction from left to right, assume that x ∈ A is welfare-maximizing for
φ and B = {y ∈ A \ {x} : φ(x, y) ≤ 0} 6= ∅. By p′ we denote some lottery on B that
is welfare-maximizing for (φij)i,j∈B. Let p be the lottery that is equal to p
′ on B and 0
otherwise, i.e., p(y) = p′(y) for all y ∈ B and p(y) = 0 for all y ∈ A \ B. By the choice
of B, we have that φ(p, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ B ∪ {x}. Moreover, for ε > 0 small enough, we
have φ(εp + (1 − ε)x, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ A \ B, since φ(x, y) > 0. Hence, εp + (1 − ε)x is
also welfare-maximizing for φ and x cannot be the unique welfare-maximizing lottery.
The direction from right to left follows from linearity of φ.
Next, we define two conditions on domains. A domain Φ is symmetric if for all φ ∈ Φ,
−φ ∈ Φ. A domain Φ is non-imposing if for all x ∈ A, there is φ ∈ Φ such that φ(x, y) > 0
for all y ∈ A.
Theorem 2. Let Φ be a symmetric and non-imposing domain. Every homogeneous, weakly
welfare-maximizing mechanism on Φ that satisfies participation is welfare-maximizing.
Proof. Let f be a homogeneous, weakly welfare-maximizing mechanism that satisfies par-
ticipation and assume for contradiction that f is not welfare-maximizing for someN ∈ F(N)
and φN ∈ Φ
N , i.e., there is a lottery q such that
∑
i∈N φi(p, q) < 0, where p = f(φN ).
By linearity of the φi, there is an alternative x such that
∑
i∈N φi(p, x) = c < 0. Now,
let N¯ be a set of agents disjoint from N such that φN¯ = −φN and j an agent that is not
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contained in N or N¯ such that x is a degenerate unique welfare-maximizing lottery for
φj , i.e., φj(x, y) > 0 for all y ∈ A \ {x}. Such an agent exists since Φ is non-imposing.
Moreover, let d = max{φj(x, y) : y ∈ A} and k be an integer such that kc+d < 0. It follows
from homogeneity that f(φkN) = f(φN ). By definition of φN¯ and φj , it follows that x is
the unique welfare-maximizing lottery for φkN∪kN¯∪{j}. Hence, x = f(φkN∪kN¯∪{j}) follows
from weak welfare maximization of f . Furthermore, we have
∑
i∈N¯
kφi(p, x) + φj(p, x) ≥ −(kc+ d) > 0,
which contradicts participation.
For the second characterization, we define non-imposition of mechanisms and a property
called cancellation, which requires that adding two agents with completely opposed prefer-
ences does not affect the outcome. A mechanism f is non-imposing if for all N ∈ F(N) and
all degenerate lotteries p ∈ ∆(A), there is φN ∈ Φ
N such that f(φN ) = p. A mechanism f
satisfies cancellation if for all N ∈ F(N), φN ∈ Φ
N , and i, i¯ 6∈ N such that φi = −φi¯ ∈ Φ,
f(φN∪{i,¯i}) = f(φN ).
Theorem 3. Let Φ be a symmetric domain. Every homogeneous, non-imposing mechanism
that satisfies cancellation and participation is welfare-maximizing.
Proof. Let f be a homogeneous, non-imposing mechanism that satisfies cancellation and
participation and assume for contradiction that f is not welfare-maximizing for some N ∈
F(N) and φN ∈ Φ
N , i.e., there is a lottery q such that
∑
i∈N φi(p, q) < 0, where p = f(φN ).
By linearity of the φi, there is an alternative x such that
∑
i∈N φi(p, x) = c < 0. Now,
let N¯ be a set of agents disjoint from N such that φN¯ = −φN . Moreover, let {j} be a
set of agents disjoint from N and N¯ such that f(φj) = x (which exists by non-imposition)
and let d = max{φj(x, y) : y ∈ A}. Then, let k be an integer such that kc + d < 0. It
follows from homogeneity that f(φkN ) = f(φN ). Since f satisfies cancellation, we have
that f(φkN∪kN¯∪{j}) = f(φN ′) = x. Furthermore, we have
∑
i∈N¯
kφi(p, x) + φj(p, x) ≥ −(kc+ d) > 0,
which contradicts participation.
3 Ordinal Mechanisms
We now turn to the important special case in which only ordinal preferences between
alternatives are known and consider ordinal mechanisms, i.e., functions that map an ordinal
preference profile to a lottery. Ordinal preferences are given in the form of complete,
reflexive, and transitive binary relations, which can be conveniently represented by SSB
functions whose entries are restricted to {−1, 0,+1}, where φi(x, y) = +1 if agent i prefers
4
x to y, φi(x, y) = −1 if he prefers y to x, and φi(x, y) = 0 if he is indifferent. We refer to
this representation as the canonical utility representation of ordinal preferences and define
ordinal mechanisms on the domain
ΦPC = {−1, 0,+1}
A×A.
Every such representation entails a complete preference relation over lotteries of alternatives
(called the pairwise comparison (PC) preference extension). The natural interpretation of
this relation is that lottery p is preferred to lottery q if the probability that p yields an
alternative preferred to the alternative returned by q is at least as large as the other way
round. For more details, please see Blavatskyy (2006) and Aziz et al. (2014, 2015).
A lottery stochastically dominates another if the former yields more expected utility
than the latter for every vNM function that is consistent with the ordinal preferences. An
ordinal mechanism satisfies ordinal participation if no group of agents can abstain from f
such that each of the agents is individually better off with respect to stochastic dominance
(see Brandl et al., 2015a).
Proposition 1. Every ordinal mechanism that satisfies participation satisfies ordinal par-
ticipation.
Proof. Let N ∈ F(N), S ( N , φN ∈ Φ
N
PC
, and f an ordinal mechanism that satisfies
participation. Participation of f implies
∑
i∈N φi(f(φN ), f(φN\S)) ≥ 0. In particular,
there is i ∈ S such that φi(f(φN ), f(φN\S)) ≥ 0. Aziz et al. (2015) have shown that
the preference relation induced by the canonical utility representation is a refinement of
stochastic dominance, i.e., if p stochastically dominates q, then p is also preferred to q with
respect to the canonical utility representation. Hence, i weakly prefers participating to
abstaining with respect to stochastic dominance.
Ordinal participation is not easily satisfied. For example, Brandl et al. (2015a) have
shown that no majoritarian ordinal mechanism can satisfy ordinal participation and ex
post efficiency.1 By leveraging the results obtained in Section 2, we can derive a num-
ber of statements concerning ordinal mechanisms that return so-called maximal lotteries.
A lottery is maximal for a given ordinal preference profile if it is welfare-maximizing for
the canonical utility representation. In the context of voting, maximal lotteries are al-
most always unique and ordinal mechanisms that return maximal lotteries form an attrac-
tive class of randomized voting rules (Fishburn, 1984a; Aziz et al., 2013a; Brandl et al.,
2015b). Such mechanisms have also been considered in the context of randomized assign-
ment (Kavitha et al., 2011; Aziz et al., 2013b).
First, Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 imply that every ordinal mechanism that returns
maximal lotteries satisfies ordinal participation.
1An ordinal mechanism is majoritarian if its output only depends on the pairwise majority relation. Ex
post efficient mechanism always assign probability 0 to Pareto dominated alternatives.
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Corollary 1. Every ordinal mechanism that returns maximal lotteries satisfies ordinal
participation.
Theorems 2 and 3 entail axiomatic characterizations of mechanisms that return maximal
lotteries. It is easily seen that ΦPC satisfies symmetry and non-imposition. Alternative
x is called a Condorcet winner of a given preference profile φN ∈ Φ
N
PC
if a majority
of agents prefers it to any other alternative, i.e.,
∑
i∈N φi(x, y) > 0 for all y ∈ A. An
ordinal mechanism is Condorcet-consistent if it always puts probability 1 on a Condorcet
winner. It follows from Lemma 1 that Condorcet-consistency is equivalent to weak welfare
maximization for the domain ΦPC . We thus obtain the following characterization as a
corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. Every homogeneous, Condorcet-consistent, ordinal mechanism that satisfies
participation returns maximal lotteries.
Corollary 2 can be contrasted with a classic result by Moulin (1988). Moulin has shown
that no Condorcet-consistent ordinal mechanism that always returns degenerate lotteries
satisfies ordinal participation.
Similarly, Theorem 3 yields an alternative characterization of maximal lotteries. Ob-
serve that non-imposition is weaker than Condorcet-consistency whereas cancellation is
independent from Condorcet-consistency.
Corollary 3. Every homogeneous, non-imposing, ordinal mechanism that satisfies cancel-
lation and participation returns maximal lotteries.
We remark that Corollaries 2 and 3 do not hold if participation is weakened to ordinal
participation. For example, the mechanism that returns the Condorcet winner if one
exists and the uniform lottery over all alternatives otherwise is homogeneous, Condorcet-
consistent, non-imposing and satisfies cancellation and ordinal participation. However,
this mechanism violates ex post efficiency let alone the stronger notion of ordinal efficiency,
which is satisfied by maximal lotteries.
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